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Highlights
• Global current account imbalances widened before the 2007/2008
crisis and have narrowed since. While the post-crisis adjustment
of European current account deficits was in line with global deve-
lopments (though more forceful), European current account sur-
pluses defied global trends and increased.
• We use panel econometric models to analyse the determinants of
medium-term current account balances. Our results confirm that
higher fiscal balances, higher GDP per capita, more rapidly aging
populations, larger net foreign assets, larger oil rents and better
legal systems increase the medium-term current account balance,
while a larger growth differential and a higher old-age dependency
ratio reduce it.
• European current account surpluses became excessive during the
past twelve years according to our estimates, while they were in
line with model predictions in the preceding three decades.
• Generally, the gap between the actual current account and its fitted
value in the model has a strong predictive power for future current
account changes. Excess deficits adjust more forcefully than ex-
cess surpluses. However, in the 2004-07 period, excess imba-
lances were amplified, which was followed by a forceful correction
in 2008-15, with the exception of European surpluses
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1.Introduction
From the mid-1990s to the global economic and financial crisis, global current account imbalances widened 
significantly. Figure 1 shows that the aggregate position of the world’s 57 ‘surplus countries’ increased from a 
surplus of 1 percent of their GDP in the mid-1990s to about 7 percent by 2007, after which a steady decline 
started. The aggregate current account position of 115 ‘deficit countries’ deteriorated to about -5 percent of 
their GDP by the crisis, which was followed by a correction. Clearly, global current account imbalances have 
significantly narrowed since 2008.  
Figure 1: Global current account balances (% GDP), 1993-2015 
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Source: author’s calculations using the April 2015 IMF World Economic Outlook.  
Note: we use the average current account balance in 2000-2007 to separate surplus (larger than 1% of GDP), balanced (between 1% 
and -1% of GDP) and deficit (below -1% of GDP) countries. Thereby we separate the 187 countries in our sample to 57 ‘surplus 
countries’, 15 ‘balanced countries’ and 115 ‘deficit countries’. The three country sub-groups include 28 main oil producers (19 
surplus, 3 balanced, 6 deficit), 28 European Union countries (8-2-18) and 130 non-EU non-oil countries excluding the United States 
(30-10-90). We excluded the United States from the third panel, because US current account developments are strongly influenced by 
the central role of the US dollar in the international monetary system and due to its large size, as the US would dominate the aggregate 
of non-EU non-oil deficit countries. Main oil producers are defined as oil rents more than 10% of GDP on average. The current account 
balance is expressed in percent of the group GDP.  
The correction of global imbalances was not just the result of smaller surpluses in the main oil-exporting 
countries. The second panel of Figure 1 shows that the combined surplus of the main oil producers reduced 
close to zero by 2015, so these countries surely played a role. Yet the third panel, which reports the position of 
non-EU countries which are not among the main oil producers, also shows a major decline in their surplus from 
about 6 percent of GDP in 2007 to about 2 percent in 2014, even if there is a slight expected increase in 2015. 
European Union current account surplus developments were different from the rest of the world in recent years. 
There was only a small drop in the surplus from 6 percent of GDP in 2007 to about 5 percent in 2008-09, but 
since then a steady increase has started and the expected surplus for 2015 is over 7 percent (panel 4 of Figure 
1). While EU current account deficits have forcefully corrected, the large and even increasing surpluses moved 
the EU’s aggregate position from a broadly balanced position before the global economic and financial crisis to 
a sizeable surplus. Thereby the EU became a major contributor to global current account imbalances. 
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Euro-area surplus countries, and in particular the Netherlands and Germany, are the key contributors to the 
EU’s current account surplus, yet Denmark (which maintains a fixed exchange rate to the euro) and Sweden 
(which has a floating exchange rate) also report large and persistent surpluses.  
Different narratives can explain the increasing EU current account surplus. The persistently high current 
surplus in a number of EU countries could be justified by various fundamentals, such as the rapid aging of 
populations, which might require the accumulation of savings. Another possible reason could be weak domestic 
demand and economic developments (both in deficit and surplus countries), which temporarily depress 
imports relative to exports. And regarding the adjustment of pre-crisis current account deficits, it is arguable 
that they became ‘excessive’ before the crisis in a number of EU countries and these deficits were bound to 
correct, thereby increasing the aggregate current account surplus of the EU.  
How important are these possible explanations for the increased current account surplus of the euro area and 
the EU? Why do post-crisis EU current account surplus developments differ so much from the developments in 
the surpluses of non-EU non-oil producer countries? How large were ‘excess’ current account deficits inside 
and outside the EU? In this paper, we answer these questions by estimating panel-econometric models to 
uncover the medium-term determinants of current account balances. 
 
2.Methodology 
There is growing literature on estimating the medium-term determinants of current account balances with 
panel econometric techniques. See for example, Chinn and Prasad (2003), Gruber and Kamin (2007), Chinn 
and Ito (2007), Gagnon (2011), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012), Cheung, Furceri and Rusticelli (2013), Chinn, 
Eichengreen and Ito (2014) and various IMF reports. These papers estimate the model: 
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variable of country i in period t, jβ is the parameter of the j-th explanatory variable and ti ,ε  is the error term. 
Most researchers estimate this model on 4 or 5-year long non-overlapping sample periods to eliminate the 
impact of business cycles and use various theories to motivate the explanatory variables. We do not add any 
country-specific or time fixed effects, because we are interested in studying the impacts of the fundamental 
determinants only. 
The most frequently used explanatory variables are the following: 
• Fiscal balance (expected sign: positive): a deviation from Ricardian Equivalence will imply that an 
increased fiscal deficit will lower national savings and thereby deteriorate the current account 
balance. Similarly to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012), we measure fiscal balance relative to the 
weighted average of trading partners (as a percent of GDP). In order to have a full sample from 1972 
onwards, we are bound to use only 41 trading parents for which data is available from 1972 as the 
reference group. 
• Economic growth (expected sign: negative): faster economic growth can indicate faster productivity 
growth, which could attract capital inflows and thereby worsen the current account balance. We 
measure economic growth with real GDP growth relative to the weighted average of 59 trading 
partners. 
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• Stage of economic development (expected sign: positive): lower level of development offers higher 
rate of return on capital according to neoclassical theory, which implies that capital should flow from 
rich to poor countries, thus poor countries are expected to have current account deficits. We measure 
the stage of economic development with GDP per capita relative to the weighted average of 59 trading 
partners. 
• Various demographic variables were used in the literature: 
o Young-age and old-age dependency ratios (expected sign: negative): the life-cycle 
hypothesis suggests that young and old people save less, thus countries with high young-
age and old-age dependency ratios tend to have larger current account deficits; 
o Population growth (expected sign: negative): fast population growth might suggest an 
increase in the share of young people, and thereby lower the current account balance; 
o Aging speed (expected sign: positive): countries in which the population is getting old more 
rapidly should save more and thereby have a larger current account surplus. This variable was 
introduced by Lane (2010) and popularised by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) and is 
measured as the 20-year forward-looking change in the old-age dependency ratio. For earlier 
years we use the actual future change (e.g. for 1980 we use the actual change from 1980 to 
2000), while for more recent years we use the United Nations 2012 population projection (eg 
for 2005 we use expected change from 2005 to 2025, where the 2025 data is from the UN 
projection).  
• Oil rents as a percent of GDP (expected sign: positive): various indicators have been used in the 
literature to isolate the impact of oil prices, production, consumption and trade on current account 
balances. We use oil rents (percent of GDP), which is influenced by oil price swings, as large oil rents 
typically lead increased exports which are not matched by corresponding imports. 
• Net foreign assets as a percent of GDP (expected sign: positive): if the steady-state NFA/GDP ratio is 
stable, in a growing economy a positive NFA position must be accompanied by a positive current 
account balance. The NFA/GDP ratio is lagged (eg the end-2011 value is used for the 2012-15 time 
period), as the NFA is determined by the past current account balances (and valuation changes) and 
it provides an initial condition for future current account balance. 
• Terms of trade (expected sign: positive): a change in world market prices of a country’s exports 
relative to its imports is expected to improve the current account balance. 
• Institutional quality (expected sign: positive): weak institutions lower the risk-adjusted return on 
investment and thereby lead to lower capital inflows and consequently lower current account 
balances. We proxy institutional quality with the index of ‘Legal system and property rights’ from the 
Economic Freedom Network, which is among the few indicators available for a sufficiently long period 
for a large number of countries. 
• Financial development (expected sign: ambiguous): low level of financial development might indicate 
an inefficient domestic financial system, which might encourage savers to invest abroad, and thereby 
a low level of financial development might coincide with a current account surplus. However, low level 
of financial development could also indicate the presence of credit constraints, which lowers private 
savings and thereby the current account surplus. We use two possible indicators: 
o The private credit/GDP ratio as a proxy for financial development, which is the standard 
indicator used in the literature. It is imperfect, as it captures only one aspect of financial 
development and might also signal the presence of credit booms. 
o The Financial Development Index (and some of its components) by Sahay et al (2009), which 
is available only for 1980-2013 (and there are some missing data for some countries for 
certain years). 
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• Various dummy variables: some papers, such as Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012), use various dummy 
variables: a crisis dummy to capture whether a country is experiencing a major economic crisis; an 
Asian crisis dummy to capture the specific disruptions of the countries concerned during the 1997/98 
Asian crisis; a dummy for financial centre to control for the possible measurement errors in the current 
account of centres of international wholesale asset trade; and a dummy for Norway which is interacted 
with net oil export to capture the country-specific institutional arrangements that govern the 
management of Norway’s oil revenues. However, we concluded that the determination of many of 
these dummy variables are questionable, while some of these dummy variables did not prove to be 
statistically significant in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) estimates. Furthermore, relative GDP 
growth is included in our study, which can capture crisis situations. Therefore, we do not include any 
dummy variable in our estimates. 
After selecting the appropriate model, we will use the estimated model to calculate the fitted current account 
values, which may correspond to a medium-term current account ‘equilibrium’ or ‘norm’. However, there are two 
issues suggesting that one should assess such fitted values with caution. 
First, our models might be imperfect and miss important variables – in which case the fitted value might not 
correspond to an equilibrium notion. Yet as we will see, the estimated gap between the actual and fitted current 
account has a strong predicting power for future changes in the current account and for most countries the 
actual current account balance fluctuates around the fitted value, which can be consistent with an equilibrium 
notion. However, for a few countries like Australia or the United States, there are persistent gaps between the 
actual and fitted values, suggesting that certain information for such countries is missing from the model. 
Second, we use the actual values of the explanatory variables to calculate fitted values for the current account, 
but the actual explanatory variables do not always correspond to medium-term sustainable values, even 
though we use time-averaged data over four-year non-overlapping periods to eliminate fluctuations related to 
the business cycle. For example, the actual fiscal position over a four-year period may not correspond to a 
medium-term sustainable position. 
The fitted values from our estimated models should be therefore assessed with caution, yet the above-
mentioned strong predictability result and the fluctuation of actual current account balances around the 
predicted values for most countries suggests that our models have useful informational content.  
 
3.Data 
In terms of the country-sample, we largely follow Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012), who considered 67 countries, 
yet in their final regression 65 countries were used. Very small countries and main oil producers are excluded, 
though Russia and Norway are included in their sample. From these 67 countries we had to disregard Taiwan, 
because several variables were not available, but added Malta to have all 28 European Union countries in our 
sample. One variable is missing for Belarus, the index of legal system and property rights, and therefore Belarus 
is not included in our models using this variable. Thus our models include 67 or 66 countries, depending on the 
use of index of legal system and property rights. 
The time period we consider is 1972-2015, which we divide into eleven 4-year long non-overlapping time 
periods. 2015 data are from IMF’s April 2015 World Economic Outlook (WEO, for those variables which are 
included in this dataset). Our data sources are the following: 
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• Current account balance: the primary source is the IMF WEO; pre-1980 values and some missing 
values were added from the IMF International Financial Statistics, World Bank World Development 
Indicators and European Commission’s AMECO database. 
• Fiscal balance: the primary source is the IMF WEO; pre-1980 values and some missing values were 
added from Mauro et al (2013), European Commission’s AMECO database and the EBRD’s Selected 
Economic Indicators database. 
• GDP growth: the primary source is the IMF WEO; pre-1980 values and some missing values were added 
from World Bank World Development Indicators, European Commission’s AMECO database, EBRD’s 
Selected Economic Indicators database and Maddison Project. 
• GDP per capita at PPP: the primary source is the IMF WEO; pre-1980 values and some missing values 
were chained backwards using data from World Bank World Development Indicators, European 
Commission’s AMECO database, EBRD’s Selected Economic Indicators database and the Maddison 
Project. 
• Young-age dependency ratio: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
• Old-age dependency ratio: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
• Population growth: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
• Aging speed (20-year forward-looking change in the old age dependency ratio): calculated using data 
on old-age dependency ratio and United Nation’s population projections (United Nations, Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2013). World Population Prospects: The 2012 
Revision, DVD Edition.) 
• Oil rents (percent of GDP): World Bank World Development Indicators. Since the most recent data point 
is 2013 and there were major oil prices changes since then, we approximated 2014-2015 values by 
assuming that oil rents as a share of GDP evolved proportionally with the evolution of oil prices. 
• Net foreign assets: the updated dataset of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
• Terms of trade: World Bank World Development Indicators and European Commission’s AMECO 
database. 
• Index of ‘Legal system and property rights’: Economic Freedom Network. 
• Private credit/GDP ratio: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
 
4.Medium-term determinants of current account balances: regression results 
We start by replicating the two main models of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) in our extended sample period, 
with the significant difference that we do not include any dummy variable. Table 1 shows remarkable similarity 
between our and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s results. Both the estimated values of the parameters and their 
significance are similar for the fiscal balance, growth differential, GDP per capita, lagged NFA and the measure 
of oil1. For aging speed, our parameter estimate is highly significant, while it was more insignificant in Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2012). Our parameter estimate for the dependency ratio is only marginally significant (11 
percent and 9 percent in the two models, respectively), while it was significant in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2012). There are only two variables for which the estimated sign of the parameter is not correct in our sample: 
population growth and the terms of trade. The R2 of the regression is slightly lower in our estimation, which 
may be explained by our disregard of the various dummy variables that Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) used, 
1 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) use ‘net oil balance (% of GDP)’, but we could not identify a data source for this variable 
and hence we use ‘oil rents (% of GDP)’, which is available in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
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in addition to the differences in the sample, such as the time period (1969-2008 versus 1972-2015) and 
country coverage (65 versus 67). 
Table 1: Medium term determinants of the current account balance: replicating the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2012) models on our sample 
 Model without terms of trade Model with terms of trade 
 
Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2012) 
This paper 
Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2012) 
This paper 
Fiscal balance (+) 0.243*** 0.180*** 0.244*** 0.184*** 
 (0.06) (0.051) (0.06) (0.051) 
Growth differential (-) −0.072 -0.098 −0.08 -0.097 
 (0.09) (0.083) (0.09) (0.082) 
GDP per capita (+) 0.027* 0.045*** 0.028* 0.044*** 
 (0.01) (0.011) (0.02) (0.011) 
Population growth (-) −0.74 0.147 −0.75 0.147 
 (0.47) (0.281) (0.48) (0.281) 
Old dependency ratio (-) −0.15** -0.080 −0.16** -0.083* 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) 
Aging speed (+) 0.056 0.171*** 0.046 0.176*** 
 (0.06) (0.041) (0.06) (0.042) 
Lagged NFA (+) 0.049*** 0.025*** 0.050*** 0.025*** 
 (0.01) (0.008) (0.01) (0.008) 
Oil balance (+) 0.239***   0.239***   
 (0.06)   (0.06)   
Oil rents (+)   0.387***   0.397*** 
   (0.08)   (0.078) 
Oil balance Norway 0.14   0.171   
 (0.11)   (0.13)   
Log terms of trade (+)     0.0107 -1.381* 
     (0.01) (0.753) 
Crisis dummy (+) 0.018**   0.018**   
 (0.01)   (0.01)   
Financial centre dummy 0.014   0.013   
 (0.01)   (0.01)   
Asian crisis dummy (+) 0.037***   0.035**   
 (0.01)   (0.01)   
Observations 503 581 496 581 
Time periods 10 11 10 11 
Number of countries 65 67 65 67 
R2 0.45 0.38 0.44 0.38 
Note: Panel estimation, non-overlapping 4-year averages (except for the lagged NFA, which refers to the last year of the 
previous 4-year period). The dependent variable is the average current account balance during the 4-year period. The 
expected sign of the parameter is indicated in brackets after the variable name. The Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) 
sample include 10 observations between 1969-2008 for 65 countries, while our sample period includes 11 observations 
between 1972-2015 for 67 countries. *,**, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. OLS estimation 
with robust standard errors. 
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 Next, we extended the model with further variables discussed in the previous section: young-age dependency 
ratio, private credit stock over GDP and the index of legal systems and property rights. Separately, we also 
added the Financial Development Index of Sahay et al (2015), which is available for a shorter sample period. 
We estimate the model for four different country samples: EU, non-EU, advanced countries, emerging countries 
(see Appendix A for the list of countries) in order to see whether the parameter estimates are robust across 
different country samples. 
Table 6 in Appendix B reports the detailed result for the full sample period (1972-2015) as well as for the first 
(1972-1995) and second (1996-2015) part of the sample. The parameter estimates of five variables are rather 
robust to alteration of the sample both in terms of countries and time: budget balance, GDP per capita, aging 
speed, lagged net foreign asset positon and oil rents. Three additional variables are estimated to have correctly 
signed and mostly significant parameter in different samples: growth differential, old age dependency ratio 
and the index of legal systems and property rights2.  
We could not establish a robust relationship between current account developments and domestic credit/GDP 
ratio (as a proxy for financial development): the parameter estimate is practically zero (ie -0.001 with a 0.006 
standard error) for the full sample, while in sub-samples of different country groups the estimated parameter 
was significantly negative for EU countries and advanced countries and significantly positive for emerging 
countries (and non-significant for non-EU countries). The use of the Financial Development Index of Sahay et 
al (2009) also suggests that results are rather different in different country groups. While in the full sample of 
all countries the parameter estimate is significantly positive, this result is driven entirely by emerging 
countries. For advanced countries and for EU countries the parameter estimate is close to zero and not 
significant. Moreover, since the Financial Development Index trends upwards for all countries, it is better to 
include it relative to trading partners to capture whether financial development of a country in a given year was 
higher or lower than in its trading partners. When we include the index this way, it was not significant anymore 
in the full sample of all countries, its significance level dropped to 11 percent in the group of emerging countries, 
while it continued to be insignificant for EU and advanced countries. Therefore, while we found some evidence 
for the importance of an indicator capturing financial development for emerging countries, supporting the 
theory that low level of financial development indicates the presence of credit constraints, which lowers private 
savings and thereby the current account surplus (a finding similar to Chinn and Prasad, 2003), the estimated 
parameter is not significant for other country groups. For this reason we did not include an indicator of financial 
development in our final model specification. 
The parameter estimates of population growth and young-age dependency ratio very much depend on the time 
period and countries included in the sample and led in many cases incorrectly signed and/or insignificant 
estimates. The parameter estimate of terms of trade became consistently negative (which is an incorrect sign) 
and significant. We therefore dropped these three variables from the model. Dropping these variables hardly 
changed the parameter estimate of the other variables, suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue. 
Table 2 reports the regression results for our final model. For the sample of all countries, parameters for six of 
the eight variables are highly statistically significant with correct signs, while for the other two variables 
(growth differential and legal systems) the estimated sign is correct, though the standard error is about the 
same as the parameter value. In some of the country sub-samples the parameter estimate of these two 
variables is also significant. The few cases with incorrectly estimated parameter signs are the following: growth 
2 The index of legal systems and property rights is not available for Belarus and therefore the number of countries in our 
sample is reduced from 67 to 66. 
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differential for the non-EU and advanced countries; the old-age dependency ratio for the EU and advanced 
countries; and the index of legal systems and property rights for the non-EU sample. When we restricted these 
parameters to zero, the estimated parameters of other variables hardly changed, suggesting again that 
multicollinearity is not an issue. 
Therefore, our results suggest that higher fiscal balance, higher GDP per capita, faster aging speed, larger net 
foreign assets, larger oil rents and better legal systems increase the medium-term current account balance, 
while a higher growth differential and larger old-age dependency ratio reduce it. 
The coefficient of determination (R2) suggests that the model fits the best for EU and advanced countries (R2 
is around 0.5), somewhat less for the non-EU sample (R2 = 0.41) and less for the emerging country sample 
(R2 = 0.21). The R2 for the full sample is 0.38, which suggests that the model explain a reasonably large share 
of the variation in current account balances. 
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Table 2: Medium term determinants of the current account balance: our final model estimated for different country samples 
 
All countries EU EU restricted Non-EU 
Non-EU 
restricted Advanced 
Advanced 
restricted Emerging 
Fiscal balance (+) 0.189*** 0.215*** 0.225*** 0.141** 0.129** 0.274*** 0.256*** 0.011 
 (0.05) (0.077) (0.076) (0.063) (0.063) (0.07) (0.074) (0.07) 
Growth differential (-) -0.095 -0.311** -0.342** 0.061   0.164   -0.137 
 (0.085) (0.151) (0.141) (0.095)   (0.185)   (0.092) 
GDP per capita (+) 0.041*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.033* 0.033** 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.034* 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) 
Old dependency ratio (-) -0.094** 0.086   -0.074 -0.108 0.157***   -0.188*** 
 (0.044) (0.071)   (0.07) (0.069) (0.052)   (0.061) 
Aging speed (+) 0.16*** 0.151*** 0.172*** 0.172*** 0.179*** 0.142** 0.178*** 0.192*** 
 (0.042) (0.05) (0.047) (0.065) (0.062) (0.056) (0.052) (0.059) 
Lagged NFA (+) 0.025*** 0.007 0.006 0.03** 0.03*** 0.022** 0.02** 0.022*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Oil rents (+) 0.387*** 0.355 0.398 0.393*** 0.414*** 0.006 0.056 0.415*** 
 (0.081) (0.302) (0.304) (0.093) (0.09) (0.146) (0.15) (0.106) 
Legal system (+) 0.113 0.719*** 0.726*** -0.107   0.37* 0.423** 0.164 
 (0.154) (0.235) (0.233) (0.209)   (0.214) (0.215) (0.228) 
Observations 570 224 224 346 355 277 277 293 
Time periods 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Number of countries 66 28 28 38 39 28 28 38 
R2 0.38 0.50 0.50 0.41 0.41 0.51 0.49 0.21 
Note: Panel estimation, non-overlapping 4-year averages (except for the lagged NFA, which refers to the last year of the previous 4-year period) between 1972-2015. The dependent variable is the 
average current account balance during the 4-year period. The expected sign of the parameter is indicated in brackets after the variable name.*,**, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels 
respectively. OLS estimation with robust standard errors. 
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5.Fitted current account balances 
We use the estimated models reported in the previous section to calculate the fitted current account values, 
which might correspond to the medium-term current account ‘equilibrium’ or ‘norm’ keeping in mind the caveats 
discussed in Section 2. Each country is included in three country groups for which we estimated our model in 
Table 2: the global sample, either EU or non-EU sample, and either the advanced country or the emerging 
country sample. While Table 2 reports the quantitative differences between the estimated parameters along 
these country-group samples, a plot of the fitted values is helpful for assessing the differences across the 
models estimated for different country samples. Appendix C presents the charts for all 66 countries included 
in our sample, while below we highlight the results for three EU aggregate country groups and for a few specific 
countries inside and outside the EU. 
 
Figure 2: Actual and fitted current account balance (% GDP), 1972-2015: EU country groups 
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Note: Fitted values are derived from the estimation results (restricted versions) reported in Table 2. The sample period includes 4-year 
non-overlapping periods (e.g. the last observation refers to 2012-15). EU surplus (7): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Netherlands and Sweden. EU balanced (2): France and Italy. EU deficit (16): Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithonia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. Luxembourg and Croatia are not 
included in the aggregates due to their shorter time series, while we left out the United Kingdom because its deficit developments very 
much differed from other deficit countries. We use the average current account balance in 2000-2007 to separate surplus (larger than 
1% of GDP), balanced (between 1% and -1% of GDP) and deficit (below -1% of GDP) countries. See the notes to Figure 1. 
 
In order to highlight the general developments in EU surplus, balanced and deficit countries (as we classified 
these countries for Figure 1), we calculated aggregates for the three groups (Figure 2). There are some 
differences between the three fitted values from the three models (in particular, the EU model tends to indicate 
somewhat larger fitted values), but the dynamics are quite similar. For the ‘surplus countries’, the actual 
current account fluctuated around the model estimates in 1980-2003, but since then large excess surpluses 
emerged (note that our sample period includes 4-year averages and therefore we can only highlight the start 
of that 4-year period when a major change is observed). The actual position of the two ‘balanced countries’ 
(France and Italy) was quite similar to model predictions, except in the 1990s, when both countries recorded 
excess surplus according to our estimates, and in 2008-11, when they had a small excess deficit. In EU ‘deficit 
countries’ (not including the United Kingdom, which is shown separately in Figure 3), there were large 
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excessive deficits in 2000-2011, which were then rapidly corrected. On average, these countries have not an 
excess surplus relative to model predictions of about 3 percent of GDP.  
Let us assess the developments in some specific countries, which also allows considering longer time periods.  
 
Figure 3: Actual and fitted current account balance (% GDP), 1972-2015: the three largest EU countries 
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Note: Fitted values are derived from the estimation results (restricted versions) reported in Table 2. The sample period includes 4-year 
non-overlapping periods (e.g. the last observation refers to 2012-15).  
 
Figure 3 reports the results for the three largest EU countries. For Germany, the actual current account 
fluctuated around the fitted values in 1972-2003, but a persistent and large positive gap emerged in 2004-15. 
In the latest time period, 2012-15, the ‘excess’ surplus of Germany was about 5 percent of GDP according to 
the global model and about 3 percent according to the EU and advanced country models. Interestingly, the 
fitted values for Germany also increased recent years. 
Table 3 decomposes the change in the fitted value between 2004-07 and 2012-15. For Germany, the three 
main contributors are: 
a. The relative fiscal balance (explaining 0.9 percentage point of GDP) increase: Figure 4 shows that while 
Germany’s fiscal position relative to its trading partners was close to zero in 2004-07, its position in 
2012-15 is about 4 percent of GDP higher. Whether this improved relative fiscal position corresponds 
to long-term sustainability is an open question. Yet as trading partners will most likely improve their 
fiscal position in coming years, while it is not expected from Germany, Germany’s relative fiscal 
position will likely decline and thereby reduce its estimated medium-term current account equilibrium 
in the coming years; 
b. Demographic factors (explaining 1.0 percentage point of GDP increase): the higher share of old-age 
people implies a 0.3 percent of GDP lower current account balance, while the rapid aging process 
implies a 1.3 percent higher balance; 
c. The increased net foreign asset position (explaining 0.5 percentage point of GDP increase): since 
Germany’s NFA position improved, more net income is expected, which increases the current account 
balance.  
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 Table 3: Contributions to the change in fitted current account values from 2004-07 to 2012-15 using the 
global model (% GDP) 
    
Germany France 
United 
Kingdom 
(1) Fitted value 2004-2007 0.2 -0.4 -0.8 
(2) Fitted value 2012-2015 2.6 -1.2 -1.4 
(3)=(2)-(1) Change in fitted value 2.4 -0.8 -0.6 
(3.1) Contribution of Fiscal balance 0.9 0.1 -0.2 
(3.2) Contribution of Growth differential -0.1 0.0 -0.1 
(3.3) Contribution of GDP per capita 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 
(3.4) Contribution of Old dependency ratio -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
(3.5) Contribution of Aging speed 1.3 0.3 0.4 
(3.6) Contribution of Lagged NFA 0.5 -0.8 -0.1 
(3.7) Contribution of Oil rents 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
(3.8) Contribution of Legal system -0.1 0.0 0.0 
(4) Actual value 2004-2007 5.5 -0.4 -2.1 
(5) Actual value 2012-2015 7.4 -1.0 -4.6 
(6)=(4)-(1) Gap 2004-2007 5.2 0.0 -1.3 
(7)=(5)-(2) Gap 2012-2015 4.8 0.2 -3.3 
Note: the estimated model reported in the first column of Table 2 is used. The contribution of each factor the change in the fitted value 
is the product of the estimated parameter and the change in the variable from 2004-07 to 2012-15. The same decomposition for all 
countries is reported in Appendix D. 
 
Figure 4: The relative fiscal balance (% GDP), 1972-2015 
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Note: The sample period includes 4-year non-overlapping periods (e.g. the last observation refers to 2012-15).  
 
France had relatively small actual deficits and surpluses in the past four decades and our estimates reported 
in Figure 3 suggest that it had an ‘excess surplus’ in 1992-2003, which corrected in later years. In the latest 
time period, 2012-15, France’s current account balance was fully in line with the prediction of the global model, 
while it had a small (about 1 percent of GDP) ‘excess’ deficit according to the EU model. The change in the fitted 
value from 2004-07 to 2012-15 is entirely due to a worsened NFA position, as all other factors cancel out. 
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The actual balance of the United Kingdom fluctuated around the fitted values from 1972-1999, after which a 
persistent negative gap emerged. In 2000-07 this gap was rather small (around 1-2 percent of GDP depending 
on which estimated model we consider), but more recently the gap widened and by 2012-15 our models 
suggest a 3-4 percent of GDP negative gap.  
 
Figure 5: Actual and fitted current account balance (% GDP), 1972-2015: three euro-area deficit countries 
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Note: Fitted values are derived from the estimation results (restricted versions) reported in Table 2. The sample period includes 4-year 
non-overlapping periods (e.g. the last observation refers to 2012-15).  
 
The results for three euro-area deficit countries reported in Figure 5 show remarkable similarity: before the mid-
1990s (in the cases of Greece and Portugal) or late 1990s (in the case of Spain), the actual current account 
balance fluctuated around the values predicted by the model. Since then, up to the global financial and 
economic crisis, large excessive current account deficits emerged, which adjusted quite abruptly, pushing the 
current account to a small surplus, well over the values predicted by the models.  
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Figure 6: Actual and fitted current account balance (% GDP), 1972-2015: three central European countries 
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Note: Fitted values are derived from the estimation results (restricted versions) reported in Table 2. The sample period includes 4-year 
non-overlapping periods (e.g. the last observation refers to 2012-15).  
 
Central European member states that joined the EU in 2004 show similar patterns to the three euro-area deficit 
countries discussed above (Figure 6). In the run-up to the crisis, current accounts recorded larger deficits that 
what were predicted by the models, while the most recent observations indicate positive gaps relative to the 
model predictions. It is noteworthy that while for Hungary and Latvia the three models predict broadly similar 
values, in the case of Poland the EU model predicts much larger current account deficits than the predictions 
of the global and emerging country models.  
We now turn to the assessment of the results for some non-EU countries. 
 
Figure 7: Actual and fitted current account balance (% GDP), 1972-2015: three non-EU advanced countries 
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Note: Fitted values are derived from the estimation results (restricted versions) reported in Table 2. The sample period includes 4-year 
non-overlapping periods (e.g. the last observation refers to 2012-15).  
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 Japan’s surplus was quite well in line with model predictions in 1980-99. After that, an excess surplus emerged, 
which started to decline more recently, along with a decline in the fitted values. The results for Norway are also 
interesting and suggest that the actual current account was more or less in line with model predictions in 1972-
99 and more recently in 2012-15, while in between the surplus was larger than what was predicted by the 
models. It is noteworthy that the model predictions suggest a secular increase in Norway’s surplus from the 
1970s onwards. The United States is an outlier in the sense that the current account balance has always been 
worse than what was predicted by the model. Most likely, the global role of the US dollar and specific 
characteristics of US foreign assets and liabilities make it possible for the US to run a current account deficit 
larger than what is predicted by a model estimated on a large number of countries3.  
 
Figure 8: Actual and fitted current account balance (% GDP), 1972-2015: three non-EU emerging countries 
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
72 80 88 96 04 12
Brazil
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual Fitted from global model Fitted from non-EU model Fitted from emerging model
China, P.R.: Mainland
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
72 80 88 96 04 12
Korea
 
Note: Fitted values are derived from the estimation results (restricted versions) reported in Table 2. The sample period includes 4-year 
non-overlapping periods (e.g. the last observation refers to 2012-15).  
 
Finally, Figure 8 shows our results for three main emerging economies. The actual current account balance of 
Brazil fluctuated around the values predicted by our models, but China had large surpluses well in excess of 
model predictions. More recently, the Chinese surplus has declined, while the fitted value moved upwards 
(largely due to the rapid aging process, and to a lesser extent due to improved fiscal position, increase in GDP 
per capita and increased NFA – see Appendix D), thereby reducing the estimated excess surplus of the country. 
Our results for Korea underline a secular increase in fitted values according to all three models, while the actual 
current account fluctuated around the model predictions. The 1997 Asian crisis was followed by a moderate 
excess surplus (about 1.5-2 percent of GDP on average in 1996-99), while in the next 12 years the actual 
current account was well in line with model predictions. More recently, however, Korea’s current account 
3 Gourinchas and Rey (2007) found for the United States that the cost of servicing its liabilities (which to a large extent 
comprise fixed income assets, partly reflecting the dominant role of the US dollar in the international monetary system) 
is much lower than the return on US investment abroad (which typically takes the form of various equity-type 
investments). Therefore, they have named the US the ‘World Venture Capitalist’. 
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surplus increased to 6 percent of GDP, though our models predicted a smaller increase (largely due to the aging 
process and to a lesser extent improved fiscal position and increase GDP per capita). 
 
6.Error correction 
If the fitted values from our model correspond to an ‘equilibrium’ current account balance, then we expect the 
actual current account to head for the predicted values. Therefore, whenever there is an excess surplus, then 
either the actual surplus is expected to decline towards the predicted surplus, or the predicted surplus is 
expected to increase towards the actual surplus (or both). A simple test of the first chain of events is to 
estimate a regression in which the change in the actual current account surplus is regressed on the previous 
period gap between the actual and the predicted surplus, similar to an error correction model: 
(2)  tititi CAGAPCA ,1,, εβα +⋅+=∆ − , 
where tiCA ,∆  is the change in the current account balance (% of GDP) of country i in period t, 
1,
^
1,1, −−− −= tititi CACACAGAP  is the previous period gap between the actual values of country i and the 
fitted values (% GDP), and ti ,ε  is the error term. A negative parameter for β would suggest that excessive 
imbalances are corrected. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012, 2014) estimated a variant of this regression 
concerning the change in the current account balance from 2005-2008 either to 2010 or to 2012, using the 
current account gaps estimated in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) for 2005-20084. They estimated a 
significantly negative value for β.  
We estimated equation (2) for our full panel sample as well as for each time period as a cross section 
regression. The results are reported in Table 4. The first block of the table shows the results for our full panel 
sample. The estimated β is significantly negative for all country groups. The parameter estimate of -0.33 for 
the sample that includes all countries indicate that one-third of excess current account surpluses and deficits 
are corrected on average from one four-year period to the next, during our 40-year long sample period5. The 
parameter estimates are somewhat higher in absolute terms for the EU (-0.55) and the emerging country (-
0.45), suggesting a stronger correction of current account gaps, while it is slightly lower for the advanced 
country group (-0.25). The results clearly indicate that our estimated current account gaps matter for the 
future development of the actual current account, which is reassuring.  
The remaining ten blocks of the table report cross section results for each 4-year period. For example, the 
second block of the table under the heading ‘1976-79’ reports the result of the regression of the change in the 
current account balance from 1972-75 to 1976-79 as a function of the 1972-75 current account gap. The 
parameter estimates are predominantly negative: there are only 6 of the 50 estimates (10 time periods x 5 
country groups) which lead to a positive estimated parameter. Four of these 6 positive parameters are from 
the pre-crisis period of 2004-07, suggesting that in the run-up to the crisis, instead of a correction of existing 
current account imbalances, they have widened. This must have led to wider current account imbalances by 
the crisis, which may explain why in the subsequent two periods, 2008-11 and 2012-15, the parameter 
4 Milesi-Ferretti (2012, 2014) include other variables in the regression, like the lagged NFA position and a dummy for 
countries having fixed exchange rate regime. 
5 Note that our full sample includes eleven 4-year long periods between 1972-2015, but since we use the lagged value of 
the current account gap, the effective sample period is reduced by one and thereby includes ten 4-year long periods 
between 1976-2015.  
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estimates turn significantly negative again, while the absolute value of parameter estimates are among the 
largest in these two periods. It is also worthwhile that the R2 of this regression dropped close to zero in 2004-
07, suggesting that even though imbalances were amplified in this period according to parameter estimates, 
existing imbalances explained very little of the variability of current account changes. However, in the 2008-
11 period, this simple regression explains about one half of the variability, suggesting that the correction of 
imbalances during the crisis played a major role in current account changes. 
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Table 4: Error correction regression results: symmetric specification of equation (2) 
    All EU non-EU Advanced Emerging 
1972-2015 β -0.33*** -0.55*** -0.31*** -0.25*** -0.45*** 
Full panel sample  s.e. (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
 Nobs 504 196 308 249 255 
  R2 0.14 0.23 0.13 0.08 0.20 
1976-79 β -0.50*** -0.43 -0.45*** -0.59*** -0.21 
cross section s.e. (0.07) (0.32) (0.09) (0.06) (0.15) 
 Nobs 27 11 16 18 9 
  R2 0.47 0.21 0.45 0.63 0.08 
1980-83 β -0.26* -0.2 -0.39** -0.1 -0.57** 
cross section s.e. (0.13) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.2) 
 Nobs 33 13 20 20 13 
  R2 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.02 0.22 
1984-87 β -0.58*** -1.16** -0.61*** -0.57** -0.42** 
cross section s.e. (0.13) (0.4) (0.17) (0.24) (0.17) 
 Nobs 41 14 27 24 17 
  R2 0.27 0.44 0.29 0.20 0.24 
1988-91 β -0.43*** -0.3 -0.49*** -0.32** -0.33 
cross section s.e. (0.13) (0.25) (0.15) (0.14) (0.26) 
 Nobs 43 14 29 25 18 
  R2 0.20 0.14 0.22 0.15 0.10 
1992-95 β -0.18 -0.25 0.01 -0.17 -0.13 
cross section s.e. (0.16) (0.2) (0.21) (0.18) (0.15) 
 Nobs 48 15 33 25 23 
  R2 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.03 
1996-99 β -0.21 -0.41 -0.33 0.06 -0.75** 
cross section s.e. (0.20) (0.25) (0.29) (0.13) (0.32) 
 Nobs 53 19 34 26 27 
  R2 0.04 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.28 
2000-04 β -0.10 -0.28* -0.16 -0.18 -0.03 
cross section s.e. (0.09) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) 
 Nobs 62 26 36 27 35 
  R2 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.00 
2004-07 β 0.23** -0.27 0.13 0.48** 0.01 
cross section s.e. (0.11) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19) (0.15) 
 Nobs 65 28 37 28 37 
  R2 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.23 0.00 
2008-11 β -0.47*** -0.67*** -0.33*** -0.30*** -0.67*** 
cross section s.e. (0.09) (0.20) (0.07) (0.06) (0.16) 
 Nobs 66 28 38 28 38 
  R2 0.48 0.41 0.41 0.45 0.55 
2012-15 β -0.54*** -0.58*** -0.46** -0.56** -0.45** 
cross section s.e. (0.13) (0.17) (0.19) (0.21) (0.18) 
 Nobs 66 28 38 28 38 
  R2 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.21 0.20 
Note: The first block reports result for the full panel sample, while the next 10 blocks show cross-section results for each 4-year long 
time period. *,**, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. OLS estimation with robust standard errors.  
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 The results reported in Table 4 based on equation (2) assumed that the impacts of excess surpluses and 
deficits are identical. Is this a correct assumption? In order to answer this question, we allow the estimated 
parameter to differ whether there was an excess deficit or an excess surplus in the previous period: 
(3)  



≥+⋅+
<+⋅+
=∆
−−
−−
0
0
1,,1,22
1,,1,11
,
tititi
tititi
ti CAGAPifCAGAP
CAGAPifCAGAP
CA
εβα
εβα
 . 
The results reported in Table 5 suggest that there is a major asymmetry: excess deficits are more forcefully 
corrected than excess surpluses. Considering the full panel sample reported in the first block of the table, the 
parameter estimates of excess deficit is highly significant in all country groups, while the parameter estimates 
for excess surpluses are only marginally significant. The absolute values of the estimated parameters are also 
much large in the case of excess deficits. The cross-section results for the ten time periods reported in the table 
also reveal that there are more cases with negative parameter estimates in the case of excess deficits, and 
these parameters are more often significant than in the case of excess surpluses.  
Similarly to the symmetric case reported in Table 4, Table 5 also suggests that there some ‘error amplification’ 
in the pre-crisis period of 2004-07 (though parameter estimates are not significant), while during and after the 
crisis, in 2008-11 and 2012-15, there were large and statistically significant ‘error correction’ effects as 
regards excess deficits. The parameter estimates for excess surpluses are correctly signed in 2008-11 and 
2012-15, but statistically significant only in the cases of non-EU and emerging countries in 2012-15. Therefore, 
our results show that there was no statistically significant error correction in EU surplus countries. 
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Table 5: Error correction regression results: asymmetric specification of equation (3) 
    All EU non-EU Advanced Emerging 
1972-2015 β1 -0.62*** -0.65*** -0.60*** -0.45*** -0.83*** 
Full panel sample  s.e. (0.10) (0.19) (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) 
 β2 -0.15 -0.09 -0.21* -0.05 -0.28** 
 s.e. (0.09) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) 
 Nobs 504 196 308 249 255 
  R2 0.17 0.25 0.16 0.11 0.24 
1976-79  β1 -0.59*** 1.18 -0.62*** -0.67*** -0.47 
cross section s.e. (0.10) (0.75) (0.09) (0.07) (0.66) 
 β2 -1.02** -0.52 -0.9*** -0.53 -0.07 
 s.e. (0.45) (0.30) (0.11) (0.32) (0.76) 
 Nobs 27 11 16 18 9 
  R2 0.53 0.40 0.76 0.64 0.12 
1980-83 β1 0.04 -0.20 -0.07 0.24 -0.89 
cross section s.e. (0.22) (0.34) (0.50) (0.16) (0.87) 
 β2 -0.13 -0.70*** 0.38* -0.20 0.52 
 s.e. (0.44) (0.20) (0.21) (0.58) (0.37) 
 Nobs 33 13 20 20 13 
  R2 0.13 0.33 0.29 0.11 0.31 
1984-87 β1 -0.68*** -1.38** -0.67*** -0.86*** -0.34 
cross section s.e. (0.18) (0.62) (0.21) (0.21) (0.30) 
 β2 -0.79** 1.88*** 1.22 0.13 -1.07 
 s.e. (0.35) (0.00) (1.39) (0.92) (0.64) 
 Nobs 41 14 27 24 17 
  R2 0.29 0.49 0.31 0.27 0.25 
1988-91 β1 -0.72* -0.88* -0.25 -0.46 -0.70 
cross section s.e. (0.40) (0.40) (0.67) (0.42) (0.75) 
 β2 -0.01 -0.08 0.04 0.09 -0.19 
 s.e. (0.18) (0.29) (0.26) (0.13) (0.20) 
 Nobs 43 14 29 25 18 
  R2 0.24 0.22 0.29 0.23 0.13 
1992-95 β1 -0.54 -0.41*** -0.07 -0.21 -0.02 
cross section s.e. (0.40) (0.07) (0.60) (0.31) (1.01) 
 β2 0.67* 1.72** 0.05 0.75 -0.38 
 s.e. (0.39) (0.64) (0.58) (0.69) (0.35) 
 Nobs 48 15 33 25 23 
  R2 0.14 0.68 0.00 0.29 0.05 
1996-99 β1 -0.65 -0.30 -0.63 0.12 -1.56*** 
cross section s.e. (0.58) (0.76) (0.59) (0.15) (0.53) 
 β2 0.25 -0.28 0.29 -0.03 -0.5 
 s.e. (0.27) (0.27) (0.33) (0.42) (0.6) 
 Nobs 53 19 34 26 27 
  R2 0.11 0.13 0.21 0.01 0.39 
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2000-04 β1 -0.18 -0.41 -1.12 0.33 -0.30 
cross section s.e. (0.26) (0.37) (0.80) (0.77) (0.29) 
 β2 -0.08 0.16 -0.24 -0.08 0.08 
 s.e. (0.16) (0.35) (0.18) (0.16) (0.41) 
 Nobs 62 26 36 27 35 
  R2 0.02 0.18 0.08 0.09 0.02 
2004-07 β1 0.01 0.50 0.18 0.08 -0.25 
cross section s.e. (0.36) (0.43) (0.49) (0.47) (0.67) 
 β2 -0.18 0.14 -0.14 0.09 0.08 
 s.e. (0.19) (0.72) (0.26) (0.37) (0.3) 
 Nobs 65 28 37 28 37 
  R2 0.16 0.14 0.09 0.31 0.01 
2008-11 β1 -0.67*** -0.80** -0.41*** -0.43*** -1.12*** 
cross section s.e. (0.20) (0.34) (0.08) (0.09) (0.28) 
 β2 -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 -0.16 -0.04 
 s.e. (0.12) (0.33) (0.14) (0.19) (0.18) 
 Nobs 66 28 38 28 38 
  R2 0.54 0.43 0.49 0.48 0.69 
2012-15 β1 -0.86*** -0.64** -0.89* -1.40*** -0.23 
cross section s.e. (0.28) (0.27) (0.47) (0.47) (0.28) 
 β2 -0.47 -0.46 -0.58* -0.40 -0.81*** 
 s.e. (0.32) (0.38) (0.29) (0.43) (0.26) 
 Nobs 66 28 38 28 38 
  R2 0.28 0.27 0.32 0.36 0.24 
Note: The first block reports result for the full panel sample, while the next 10 blocks show cross-section results for each 4-year long 
time period. *,**, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. OLS estimation with robust standard errors.  
 
7.Conclusions 
From the mid-1990s to the global economic and financial crisis, global current account imbalances widened 
significantly, while there has been a major correction since then. The adjustment of European current account 
deficits has been in line with global developments (though they were more forceful), but European current 
account surpluses defied global trends and continued to increase to over 7 percent of GDP. Thus, from a broadly 
balanced current account position before the global crisis the EU became a major contributor to global current 
account imbalances. 
In order to assess various explanations for the EU’s increased surplus, we use a standard panel econometric 
model to analyse the determinants of medium-term current account balances. We estimate the model for 66 
countries during eleven 4-year long non-overlapping periods from 1972-2015, and study the model’s 
robustness in different time periods and country samples. We consider several variables studied in previous 
literature and confirm that higher fiscal balance, higher GDP per capita, more rapidly aging populations, larger 
net foreign assets, larger oil rents and better legal systems increase the medium-term current account 
balance, while a larger growth differential and a higher old-age dependency ratio reduce it. We could not 
establish a robust relationship between current account developments and the terms of trade, domestic 
credit/GDP ratio (as a proxy for financial development), the financial development index of the IMF, population 
growth and the young-age dependency ratio. 
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We found that in the first eight 4-year long periods of our sample, 1972-2003, the actual balance of European 
surplus countries fluctuated around the predictions of our model, but in the latest three 4-year periods, 2004-
15, large positive gaps emerged. While worsening demographic developments, improved fiscal positions and 
increased net foreign assets explain some of the increase in European current account surpluses, they became 
excessive according to our estimation results considering all variants of our model. Current account deficits in 
several EU countries were highly excessive before the crisis according to our results and were forcefully 
corrected. Most previous EU deficit countries display an excess surplus now. 
The gap between the actual current account balance and its fitted value in the model has a strong predictive 
power for future current account developments in a panel specification that treats surpluses and deficits 
symmetrically. An asymmetric model which allows different correction of excess surpluses and deficits 
suggests that the adjustment of excess deficits is more forceful than the adjustment of excess surpluses. 
Cross-section estimates for individual 4-year long periods suggests that the 2004-07 period was special in the 
past four decades, because excess imbalances were amplified during this period, though such amplification 
explained a small fraction of the variance of current account changes. In 2008-15, a forceful correction 
followed, when the adjustment of earlier excess imbalances explained a large share of the variation of current 
account balance changes, except for EU surplus countries. 
Our key conclusion considering various versions of our models is that European current account surpluses 
became excessive in the past twelve years as neither their level nor their dynamics can be justified by standard 
panel econometric models. Such results raise important policy questions and support the conclusions of the 
European Commission (2015) and the IMF (2015) in their assessment of the current account surplus of 
Germany, the country with the largest surplus in the EU. Decisive policy actions, such as bold structural reforms 
and demand management, are needed to alleviate the problem of excessive current account balances, as 
discussed by Darvas and Wolff (2014). 
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Appendix A: List of countries included in our sample 
 
Note: we use the average current account balance in 2000-2007 to separate surplus (larger than 1% of GDP), balanced (between 1% 
and -1% of GDP) and deficit (below -1% of GDP) countries. See the notes to Figure 1. 
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Argentina x x x Latvia x x x
Australia x x x Lithuania x x x
Austria x x x Luxembourg x x x
Belgium x x x Malaysia x x x
Brazil x x x Matla x x x
Bulgaria x x x Mexico x x x
Canada x x x Morocco x x x
Chile x x x Netherlands x x x
China, P.R.: Mainland x x x New Zealand x x x
China,P.R.: Hong Kong x x x Norway x x x
Colombia x x x Pakistan x x x
Costa Rica x x x Peru x x x
Croatia x x x Philippines x x x
Cyprus x x x Poland x x x
Czech Republic x x x Portugal x x x
Denmark x x x Romania x x x
Dominican Republic x x x Russia x x x
El Salvador x x x Serbia x x x
Estonia x x x Singapore x x x
Finland x x x Slovakia x x x
France x x x Slovenia x x x
Germany x x x South Africa x x x
Greece x x x Spain x x x
Guatemala x x x Sri Lanka x x x
Hungary x x x Sweden x x x
Iceland x x x Switzerland x x x
India x x x Thailand x x x
Indonesia x x x Tunisia x x x
Ireland x x x Turkey x x x
Israel x x x Ukraine x x x
Italy x x x United Kingdom x x x
Japan x x x United States x x x
Korea x x x Uruguay x x x
26
Appendix B: Estimation results for the broad model 
Table 6: Medium term determinants of the current account balance: the broad model estimated for different country samples 
A: full sample 1972-
2015 
All countries 
All countr. 
restricted EU 
EU 
restricted Non-EU 
Non-EU 
restricted Advanced 
Advanced 
restricted Emerging 
Emerging 
restricted 
Fiscal balance (+) 0.201*** 0.194*** 0.257*** 0.236*** 0.147** 0.083 0.277*** 0.242*** -0.003   
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.072) (0.076) (0.068) (0.071) (0.07) (0.065) (0.071)   
Growth differential (-) -0.087 -0.104 -0.268* -0.375** 0.027   0.127   -0.111 -0.244*** 
 (0.088) (0.087) (0.155) (0.149) (0.095)   (0.194)   (0.093) (0.084) 
GDP per capita (+) 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.118*** 0.111*** 0.027 0.03* 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.051** 0.025 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.019) 
Population growth (-) -0.021   -1.112** -0.594 0.356   -0.248 -0.539 0.088 -0.225 
 (0.422)   (0.494) (0.458) (0.601)   (0.646) (0.468) (0.568) (0.544) 
Young depend. ratio (-) 0.021   0.195***   -0.06* -0.05** 0.066   -0.059* -0.055** 
 (0.029)   (0.049)   (0.034) (0.024) (0.066)   (0.031) (0.024) 
Old dependency ratio (-) -0.073 -0.096** 0.15**   -0.123* -0.179** 0.186***   -0.23** -0.261*** 
 (0.051) (0.045) (0.07)   (0.071) (0.077) (0.066)   (0.091) (0.09) 
Aging speed (+) 0.196*** 0.168*** 0.363*** 0.243*** 0.088 0.097 0.291*** 0.276*** -0.038   
 (0.062) (0.051) (0.062) (0.05) (0.098) (0.096) (0.072) (0.065) (0.09)   
Lagged NFA (+) 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.002 0.004 0.028** 0.029** 0.021** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.025*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Oil rents (+) 0.403*** 0.389*** 0.474 0.457 0.408*** 0.44*** -0.052   0.447*** 0.311*** 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.307) (0.311) (0.088) (0.09) (0.164)   (0.091) (0.096) 
Log terms of trade (+) -1.481*   -2.053   -1.922**   0.759 0.978 -3.084***   
 (0.797)   (2.209)   (0.8)   (1.456) (1.275) (0.98)   
Legal system (+) 0.175 0.162 0.829*** 0.831*** -0.361*   0.622*** 0.515** -0.333   
 (0.167) (0.157) (0.222) (0.236) (0.215)   (0.23) (0.211) (0.222)   
Private credit (+/-) -0.001 -0.001 -0.017*** -0.018*** 0.009 0.007 -0.02** -0.02*** 0.031*** 0.026*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.01) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) 
Observations 561 561 222 222 339 348 270 274 291 326 
Time periods 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Number of countries 66 66 28 28 38 39 28 28 38 39 
R2 0.37 0.37 0.57 0.54 0.41 0.39 0.53 0.52 0.30 0.23 
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B: 1st part of the 
sample 1972-1995 
All countries 
All countr. 
restricted 
EU 
EU 
restricted 
Non-EU 
Non-EU 
restricted 
Advanced 
Advanced 
restricted 
Emerging 
Emerging 
restricted 
Fiscal balance (+) 0.125* 0.115* 0.042 0.04 0.213** 0.179* 0.101 0.085 -0.089   
 (0.064) (0.063) (0.087) (0.085) (0.096) (0.099) (0.075) (0.07) (0.109)   
Growth differential (-) -0.092 -0.117 0.049   -0.098 -0.151 0.021 -0.034 -0.031 -0.18* 
 (0.091) (0.094) (0.196)   (0.105) (0.11) (0.209) (0.216) (0.107) (0.093) 
GDP per capita (+) 0.015 0.014 0.063** 0.061** 0.01 0.008 0.05*** 0.046*** 0.037 0.026 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.025) (0.025) (0.02) (0.009) (0.018) (0.016) (0.026) (0.025) 
Population growth (-) -0.102 -0.149 -1.584** -1.512*** 0.472   0.314   -1.184 -1.031 
 (0.701) (0.649) (0.647) (0.563) (0.928)   (0.84)   (1.069) (0.661) 
Young depend. ratio (-) -0.006 -0.009 -0.028 -0.031 -0.007   -0.128 -0.138*** 0.021   
 (0.038) (0.033) (0.076) (0.075) (0.041)   (0.078) (0.044) (0.049)   
Old dependency ratio (-) 0.039   -0.196 -0.205* 0.122   0.114   -0.122 -0.128 
 (0.081)   (0.125) (0.119) (0.122)   (0.09)   (0.143) (0.139) 
Aging speed (+) 0.119* 0.116** 0.115 0.106 0.098 0.066 0.113 0.08 0.129   
 (0.066) (0.058) (0.137) (0.134) (0.092) (0.076) (0.081) (0.065) (0.256)   
Lagged NFA (+) 0.019*** 0.02*** 0.018** 0.019*** 0.014* 0.016* 0.011 0.011 0.022*** 0.023*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.01) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Oil rents (+) 0.141** 0.158** 0.346 0.331 0.143** 0.167** -0.029   0.103 0.053 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.291) (0.299) (0.072) (0.072) (0.158)   (0.064) (0.08) 
Log terms of trade (+) -0.595   0.552 0.525 -1.337   0.776 0.898 -2.627**   
 (0.915)   (2.323) (2.32) (1.023)   (1.286) (1.067) (1.25)   
Legal system (+) -0.209   0.465 0.472 -0.604***   -0.142   -0.337   
 (0.179)   (0.302) (0.303) (0.224)   (0.309)   (0.265)   
Private credit (+/-) 0.012 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.029** 0.02** 0.004 0.005 0.011 0.014 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.01) (0.01) (0.008) (0.015) (0.013) 
Observations 242 248  85  85 157 161 136 142 106 135 
Time periods 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Number of countries 52 52 18 18 34 34 26 26 26 27 
R2 0.28 0.28 0.42 0.42 0.30 0.27 0.40 0.42 0.19 0.11 
 
28
C: 2nd part of the 
sample 1996-2015 
All countries 
All countr. 
restricted 
EU 
EU 
restricted 
Non-EU 
Non-EU 
restricted 
Advanced 
Advanced 
restricted 
Emerging 
Emerging 
restricted 
Fiscal balance (+) 0.233*** 0.242*** 0.475*** 0.448*** 0.064 0.086 0.725*** 0.521*** -0.002   
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.159) (0.149) (0.098) (0.099) (0.165) (0.127) (0.095)   
Growth differential (-) -0.072 -0.156 -0.538** -0.627*** 0.239   -0.053   -0.062 -0.149 
 (0.147) (0.145) (0.251) (0.2) (0.166)   (0.366)   (0.154) (0.124) 
GDP per capita (+) 0.064*** 0.059*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.071** 0.061* 0.108*** 0.096*** 0.076** 0.037 
 (0.02) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.035) (0.032) (0.023) (0.022) (0.03) (0.025) 
Population growth (-) -0.298   -1.283** -1.134* -0.462 -0.193 -2.202** -1.355* 0.301   
 (0.554)   (0.595) (0.59) (0.813) (0.78) (0.962) (0.773) (0.646)   
Young depend. ratio (-) 0.099**   0.36***   -0.03 -0.03 0.364***   0.015   
 (0.044)   (0.115)   (0.052) (0.04) (0.107)   (0.053)   
Old dependency ratio (-) -0.082 -0.165*** 0.146   -0.257** -0.266** 0.168   -0.138 -0.188*** 
 (0.069) (0.059) (0.09)   (0.104) (0.104) (0.11)   (0.12) (0.066) 
Aging speed (+) 0.196** 0.093 0.385*** 0.266*** -0.044   0.27** 0.173 -0.033   
 (0.085) (0.071) (0.089) (0.079) (0.139)   (0.118) (0.111) (0.121)   
Lagged NFA (+) 0.024** 0.024** -0.008   0.03* 0.031* 0.022** 0.018* 0.015 0.015 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.009)   (0.017) (0.016) (0.01) (0.01) (0.012) (0.012) 
Oil rents (+) 0.662*** 0.551*** 0.472 0.518 0.595*** 0.552*** -0.428**   0.799*** 0.705*** 
 (0.119) (0.111) (0.586) (0.614) (0.128) (0.132) (0.205)   (0.113) (0.097) 
Log terms of trade (+) -3.449**   -2.457   -3.21**   -0.661   -4.642***   
 (1.479)   (6.389)   (1.347)   (4.076)   (1.34)   
Legal system (+) 0.356 0.31 0.473 0.977*** -0.117 0.071 -0.141 0.22 -0.122   
 (0.267) (0.265) (0.398) (0.361) (0.431) (0.393) (0.447) (0.43) (0.4)   
Private credit (+/-) -0.006 -0.007 -0.023*** -0.021*** 0.005 0 -0.019 -0.024** 0.039*** 0.036*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.01) (0.011) (0.008) 
Observations 319 319 137 139 182 182 134 134 185 191 
Time periods 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Number of countries 66 66 28 28 38 38 28 28 38 39 
R2 0.46 0.44 0.64 0.63 0.52 0.50 0.62 0.59 0.42 0.38 
 
29
Appendix C: Actual and fitted current accounts for all countries in our sample 
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Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Norway
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Australia
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
New Zealand
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Canada
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Japan
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
United States
 
32
-4
0
4
8
12
16
-4
0
4
8
12
16
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
China,P.R.: Hong Kong
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Israel
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Singapore
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Argentina
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Brazil
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Chile
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
China, P.R.: Mainland
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Colombia
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Costa Rica
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Dominican Republic
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Guatemala
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Indonesia
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-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
India
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Korea
-16
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
-16
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Sri Lanka
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Morocco
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Mexico
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Malaysia
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Peru
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Philippines
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Pakistan
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Russia
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Serbia
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
El Salvador
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-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from non-EU model
Fitted from emerging model
Thailand
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from non-EU model
Fitted from emerging model
Tunisia
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from non-EU model
Fitted from emerging model
Turkey
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from non-EU model
Fitted from emerging model
Ukraine
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from non-EU model
Fitted from emerging model
Uruguay
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from non-EU model
Fitted from emerging model
South Africa
 
Note: Fitted values are derived from the estimation results (restricted versions) reported in Table 2. The sample period includes 4-year non-overlapping 
periods (e.g. the last observation refers to 2012-15).  
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Appendix D: Contributions to the change in fitted current account values from 2004-07 to 2012-15 using the global model (% GDP) 
    AR AT AU BE BG BR CA CH CL CN 
(1) Fitted value 2004-2007 -1.1 -0.3 0.1 1.0 -2.7 -1.9 2.3 4.3 -0.5 -1.5 
(2) Fitted value 2012-2015 -0.5 0.7 -0.7 1.6 -4.8 -0.8 2.2 4.5 0.5 0.2 
(3)=(2)-(1) Change in fitted value 0.7 1.0 -0.8 0.6 -2.1 1.1 0.0 0.2 1.0 1.7 
(3.1) Contribution of Fiscal balance -0.5 0.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.8 0.2 -0.3 0.2 -0.8 0.4 
(3.2) Contribution of Growth differential 0.5 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
(3.3) Contribution of GDP per capita 0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 
(3.4) Contribution of Old dependency ratio -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 
(3.5) Contribution of Aging speed 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.7 -0.2 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.0 
(3.6) Contribution of Lagged NFA 1.3 0.3 0.1 0.4 -1.3 0.4 0.1 -0.2 0.9 0.3 
(3.7) Contribution of Oil rents -1.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.5 
(3.8) Contribution of Legal system 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(4) Actual value 2004-2007 2.0 2.5 -6.2 4.8 -14.8 1.2 1.6 13.0 3.2 6.9 
(5) Actual value 2012-2015 -0.9 1.8 -3.6 0.7 0.4 -3.3 -2.8 8.3 -2.4 2.4 
(6)=(4)-(1) Gap 2004-2007 3.2 2.8 -6.3 3.8 -12.2 3.1 -0.7 8.7 3.7 8.4 
(7)=(5)-(2) Gap 2012-2015 -0.4 1.0 -2.9 -0.9 5.1 -2.5 -5.0 3.8 -2.9 2.2 
 
    CO CR CY CZ DE DK DO EE ES FI 
(1) Fitted value 2004-2007 -0.3 -2.6 0.2 -1.4 0.2 2.1 -3.9 -4.0 -1.4 1.3 
(2) Fitted value 2012-2015 0.9 -1.9 -1.6 -2.5 2.6 1.1 -3.6 -3.1 -2.9 0.5 
(3)=(2)-(1) Change in fitted value 1.3 0.7 -1.8 -1.1 2.4 -1.1 0.3 0.9 -1.5 -0.8 
(3.1) Contribution of Fiscal balance 0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.9 -0.7 -0.1 0.1 -1.3 -0.8 
(3.2) Contribution of Growth differential 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 
(3.3) Contribution of GDP per capita 0.1 0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.2 -0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 
(3.4) Contribution of Old dependency ratio -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 
(3.5) Contribution of Aging speed 0.5 0.8 0.4 -0.5 1.3 -0.1 0.5 0.0 1.1 -0.4 
(3.6) Contribution of Lagged NFA 0.2 0.0 -1.8 -0.5 0.5 0.9 -0.3 0.5 -0.9 1.0 
(3.7) Contribution of Oil rents 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(3.8) Contribution of Legal system 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(4) Actual value 2004-2007 -1.8 -5.0 -6.8 -2.9 5.5 3.1 -1.4 -12.7 -7.9 5.2 
(5) Actual value 2012-2015 -4.3 -4.6 -2.9 0.0 7.4 6.3 -4.0 -1.0 0.4 -0.7 
(6)=(4)-(1) Gap 2004-2007 -1.5 -2.4 -7.0 -1.5 5.2 1.0 2.6 -8.7 -6.5 3.9 
(7)=(5)-(2) Gap 2012-2015 -5.3 -2.8 -1.3 2.5 4.8 5.2 -0.4 2.1 3.2 -1.3 
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    FR GB GR GT HK HR HU ID IE IL 
(1) Fitted value 2004-2007 -0.4 -0.8 -3.8 -2.9 10.0 -3.0 -4.7 -1.4 1.0 -2.3 
(2) Fitted value 2012-2015 -1.2 -1.4 -3.4 -2.9 13.5 -4.0 -4.4 -1.8 -1.5 -0.9 
(3)=(2)-(1) Change in fitted value -0.8 -0.6 0.5 0.0 3.5 -1.0 0.3 -0.4 -2.5 1.4 
(3.1) Contribution of Fiscal balance 0.1 -0.2 0.9 0.3 0.3 -0.2 1.0 0.1 -0.9 0.3 
(3.2) Contribution of Growth differential 0.0 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.3 0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.1 
(3.3) Contribution of GDP per capita -0.1 -0.1 -0.6 0.0 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.4 0.2 
(3.4) Contribution of Old dependency ratio -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 
(3.5) Contribution of Aging speed 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.1 1.6 0.5 -0.3 0.6 0.4 0.1 
(3.6) Contribution of Lagged NFA -0.8 -0.1 -0.5 -0.1 1.1 -1.2 0.0 0.2 -1.6 0.8 
(3.7) Contribution of Oil rents 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1 0.0 0.0 
(3.8) Contribution of Legal system 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(4) Actual value 2004-2007 -0.4 -2.1 -9.4 -4.9 11.9 -5.7 -7.4 1.6 -3.2 3.1 
(5) Actual value 2012-2015 -1.0 -4.6 0.1 -2.2 1.7 0.9 3.8 -3.0 4.2 2.7 
(6)=(4)-(1) Gap 2004-2007 0.0 -1.3 -5.6 -2.0 1.9 -2.7 -2.7 3.0 -4.2 5.4 
(7)=(5)-(2) Gap 2012-2015 0.2 -3.3 3.5 0.7 -11.8 4.9 8.2 -1.1 5.8 3.6 
 
    IN IS IT JP KR LK LT LU LV MA 
(1) Fitted value 2004-2007 -4.0 -0.7 -1.4 1.5 1.4 -4.6 -3.6 7.7 -4.2 -3.3 
(2) Fitted value 2012-2015 -3.7 -12.0 -0.9 -0.5 3.3 -3.8 -2.7 7.0 -4.5 -3.2 
(3)=(2)-(1) Change in fitted value 0.3 -11.3 0.5 -2.0 1.9 0.8 0.9 -0.7 -0.2 0.1 
(3.1) Contribution of Fiscal balance 0.3 -0.4 0.4 -0.3 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.1 
(3.2) Contribution of Growth differential 0.1 0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4 -0.1 
(3.3) Contribution of GDP per capita 0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 0.4 0.2 0.3 -0.4 0.2 0.1 
(3.4) Contribution of Old dependency ratio -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -1.0 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 
(3.5) Contribution of Aging speed 0.3 0.5 1.0 -0.9 1.5 0.3 0.6 1.0 -0.1 0.6 
(3.6) Contribution of Lagged NFA -0.2 -11.4 -0.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 -0.3 -1.4 -0.6 -0.5 
(3.7) Contribution of Oil rents -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(3.8) Contribution of Legal system -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(4) Actual value 2004-2007 -1.0 -15.6 -1.1 4.1 1.7 -3.8 -10.0 10.8 -16.3 1.4 
(5) Actual value 2012-2015 -2.3 3.0 1.2 1.0 5.9 -4.1 0.1 5.1 -2.7 -6.6 
(6)=(4)-(1) Gap 2004-2007 3.0 -14.9 0.3 2.6 0.3 0.8 -6.5 3.1 -12.1 4.7 
(7)=(5)-(2) Gap 2012-2015 1.4 15.1 2.1 1.5 2.6 -0.3 2.7 -1.9 1.7 -3.4 
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    MT MX MY NL NO NZ PE PH PK PL 
(1) Fitted value 2004-2007 1.2 -0.1 1.2 1.8 11.5 -0.7 -2.4 -4.1 -4.2 -2.7 
(2) Fitted value 2012-2015 0.0 -0.4 1.3 2.4 9.3 -0.9 -1.3 -2.4 -4.1 -2.3 
(3)=(2)-(1) Change in fitted value -1.2 -0.2 0.1 0.7 -2.2 -0.2 1.1 1.7 0.1 0.4 
(3.1) Contribution of Fiscal balance 0.4 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 0.3 0.6 -0.2 0.2 
(3.2) Contribution of Growth differential -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.1 
(3.3) Contribution of GDP per capita 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.4 
(3.4) Contribution of Old dependency ratio -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 
(3.5) Contribution of Aging speed -0.1 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 
(3.6) Contribution of Lagged NFA -0.9 -0.1 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.5 1.2 0.0 -0.3 
(3.7) Contribution of Oil rents 0.0 -0.5 -1.2 0.0 -2.4 0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 
(3.8) Contribution of Legal system 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
(4) Actual value 2004-2007 -6.7 -1.0 14.5 7.3 14.2 -6.4 1.6 3.7 -1.9 -4.6 
(5) Actual value 2012-2015 3.1 -2.0 4.1 10.0 9.6 -3.9 -3.9 4.2 -1.4 -2.0 
(6)=(4)-(1) Gap 2004-2007 -7.9 -0.9 13.3 5.5 2.8 -5.7 4.0 7.8 2.2 -1.9 
(7)=(5)-(2) Gap 2012-2015 3.1 -1.6 2.8 7.5 0.4 -3.0 -2.6 6.7 2.7 0.3 
 
    PT RO RU SE SG SI SK SQ SV TH 
(1) Fitted value 2004-2007 -3.4 -3.0 6.5 -0.4 12.2 -0.6 -2.2 -3.6 -4.1 -0.7 
(2) Fitted value 2012-2015 -3.5 -3.0 4.0 -0.9 12.3 -2.0 -2.3 -3.7 -4.0 0.8 
(3)=(2)-(1) Change in fitted value -0.1 0.0 -2.4 -0.5 0.1 -1.4 0.0 -0.1 0.1 1.5 
(3.1) Contribution of Fiscal balance 0.4 0.1 -1.3 -0.2 -0.2 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.2 0.0 
(3.2) Contribution of Growth differential 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 
(3.3) Contribution of GDP per capita -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.9 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 
(3.4) Contribution of Old dependency ratio -0.3 -0.1 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 
(3.5) Contribution of Aging speed 0.8 0.5 0.4 -0.3 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 1.2 
(3.6) Contribution of Lagged NFA -0.9 -0.8 0.1 0.4 -1.6 -0.8 -0.7 -0.3 -0.3 0.7 
(3.7) Contribution of Oil rents 0.0 -0.2 -2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
(3.8) Contribution of Legal system 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
(4) Actual value 2004-2007 -9.7 -10.0 9.0 7.5 22.7 -2.6 -6.2 -12.1 -4.5 1.2 
(5) Actual value 2012-2015 0.3 -1.7 3.4 6.6 18.7 5.3 0.8 -7.1 -5.3 1.8 
(6)=(4)-(1) Gap 2004-2007 -6.2 -6.9 2.5 7.9 10.5 -2.1 -4.0 -8.6 -0.4 1.9 
(7)=(5)-(2) Gap 2012-2015 3.8 1.3 -0.6 7.6 6.4 7.2 3.0 -3.4 -1.3 1.0 
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    TN TR UA US UY ZA 
(1) Fitted value 2004-2007 -3.2 -2.8 -3.7 1.5 -2.8 -1.8 
(2) Fitted value 2012-2015 -2.6 -1.9 -3.0 1.0 -2.2 -2.4 
(3)=(2)-(1) Change in fitted value 0.6 0.9 0.7 -0.5 0.6 -0.6 
(3.1) Contribution of Fiscal balance -0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.5 
(3.2) Contribution of Growth differential 0.1 0.2 0.7 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 
(3.3) Contribution of GDP per capita 0.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.0 
(3.4) Contribution of Old dependency ratio 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 
(3.5) Contribution of Aging speed 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.4 -0.1 
(3.6) Contribution of Lagged NFA 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.1 
(3.7) Contribution of Oil rents -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 
(3.8) Contribution of Legal system -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
(4) Actual value 2004-2007 -1.9 -5.0 2.0 -5.4 -0.7 -3.9 
(5) Actual value 2012-2015 -8.0 -6.0 -5.7 -2.5 -4.8 -5.2 
(6)=(4)-(1) Gap 2004-2007 1.3 -2.2 5.7 -6.9 2.1 -2.1 
(7)=(5)-(2) Gap 2012-2015 -5.4 -4.1 -2.7 -3.4 -2.6 -2.8 
Note: see notes to Table 3. 
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